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Putting a price on planning? Reimagining planning as “market 1 
maker”  2 
Abstract 3 
Planning has been widely vilified for the role it plays in disrupting the development process, 4 
hindering economic growth and creating the conditions for undersupply in housing markets 5 
characterised by unaffordability. In this paper we hope to show that the analyses that 6 
support this view of planning are incomplete because of the theoretical limitations of the 7 
neoclassical tradition from which they emerge.  By way of alternative we posit an account of 8 
planning that draws upon game theory and behavioural economics to explore those aspects 9 
of the activity that serve to animate the development process.  This interpretation of 10 
planning as a ‘market maker’ is explored through empirical case study research from three 11 
Continental European contexts where planning is charged with playing an economically 12 
active role to control liquidity.       13 
 14 
Keywords: urban/environmental planning, game theory, behavioural economics, 15 
development process.   16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
2 
 
Introduction 23 
The case for thinking of planning as a disruptive force, the principal effect of which is the 24 
creation of market distortions, has been made extensively (Nathan and Overman, 2011; 25 
Cheshire et al, 2014; Cheshire, 2014; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016).  In recent times this 26 
debate has been re-animated by an exchange between Overman (2014a, 2014b) and 27 
Haughton, Deas and Hincks (2014a, 2014b).  The aggregate of these contributions (together 28 
with others in cognate literature) is that the costs of planning are real but greatly more 29 
amenable to measurement through a neoclassical understanding of the effects of regulation 30 
on real estate prices than the, equally acknowledged, benefits of planning.  Indeed, if we 31 
were to respond in kind to the neoclassical impulse to measure the costs of planning with an 32 
account of how we collectively benefit from the activity we would need to disentangle a 33 
range of environmental and social variables.  This in turn would entail engaging with the 34 
great academic controversies that ecosystem services accounting and social cost-benefit 35 
analyses serve primarily to define rather than conclusively end – questions such as, does the 36 
natural environment have a computable economic value and should urban policy 37 
investment decisions be made on the basis of forecast returns or continuing the struggle 38 
against inter-generational poverty? 39 
Modesty dictates that we must be honest: it may be impossible to produce an econometric 40 
analysis that clearly establishes to a satisfactory degree of certainty precisely what we 41 
collectively get out of planning.  The underlying problem is that many of the positive aspects 42 
that most accept are an outcome of the process of regulatory policy for land and property 43 
markets are matters for ethical debate and are not well accommodated by the framework 44 
of neoclassical economics.  Nevertheless, because of this analytical mismatch the inaccurate 45 
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impression that planning is an activity that principally bears only costs has become close to 46 
an accepted wisdom amongst the political élite in nations such as Britain, and constructed 47 
into formulations to “get the planners off our backs” or overbearing, strained associations 48 
between planning and communism (Cameron, quoted in Kirkup, 2012; Birmingham Post, 49 
2010).  Rarely have the political class been held to account for the selectivity with which 50 
they have used academic evidence.  For example, Overman (2014a) explicitly acknowledges 51 
that planning supports social and environmental benefits and points out that he has 52 
debated whether the measured costs of the activity outweigh these benefits even with his 53 
closest collaborators.  Moreover the same authors who are frequently cited favourably by 54 
politicians as justifying less planning have actually advocated a more powerful role for state 55 
agency in controlling land supply (Cheshire, Nathan and Overman, 2014).  Yet, the 56 
complexity of the underlying problems that these observations imply has seemingly had 57 
little bearing on the political discourses that have been crafted in response to the academic 58 
literature. 59 
To provide a corrective to this politicised interpretation of academic work, in this paper we 60 
turn to a different branch of economics: game theory.  More specifically we do not seek to 61 
quantify the outcomes of planning decisions as these are clearly questions that relate as 62 
much, if not more, to ethics, culture and social cohesion as they do to the mechanics of 63 
economic analysis.  Instead we look to the function performed by planning as an 64 
intermediary that provides market making services. This market making role is common in 65 
many markets even those that do not possess some of the peculiar complexities that 66 
characterise land and real estate.  In the context of urban and environmental management 67 
the terms of what making markets’ might confer would be wider than in other areas, such 68 
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as securities exchanges, as real estate markets possess some complicating factors: land 69 
assembly prior to development may be inhibited by sites in multiple ownership, 70 
transformation of land into new buildings inevitably takes a sustained period of time and 71 
questions of public interest and local democracy are relevant to the final outcome. 72 
In this paper we seek to explore how other nations have chosen to deal with these issues by 73 
empowering - not diminishing - their planning systems and re-imagining planning as an 74 
activity that is an active market participant, often a first mover or catalyst, in the 75 
development process.  In order to investigate this we draw upon the analytical rubric 76 
provided by game theory to conceptualise the interactions that occur between planning and 77 
other market actors in the development process.   78 
Market stability, liquidity and the role of the ‘market maker’ 79 
Fundamentally a market maker is a catalysing intermediary that exists to support market 80 
integrity.  As an economic function it is most necessary in markets that are geographically 81 
diffuse, disembodied, characterised by large numbers of transactions or in which there are 82 
systemic obstacles to transactions taking place easily.  Although initially coined to describe a 83 
range of functions provided by intermediaries on financial exchanges the expression is now 84 
used much more widely to describe any set of circumstances that requires a third party to 85 
animate a market.  As a result the literature on online markets (Kim and Ahn, 2006); 86 
business-to-business transactions (Klein and Quelch, 1997), new product development 87 
(Teichart, von Wartburg and Braterman, 2006) and the development of retail (Godley and 88 
Casson, 2015; Hamilton, Petrovic and Senauer, 2011) all make use of the expression “market 89 
maker” to describe the, often complicated, processes by which markets become established 90 
and remain functional over time.  91 
5 
 
Critically, the suite of activities that comprise market making can be wide ranging.  For 92 
example, in the financial services industry where the term was born, the role of a market 93 
maker is usually defined as twofold: firstly, to take positions in assets (equities, 94 
commodities, currencies, derivatives) that correspondingly allows the market maker to 95 
control liquidity through acting as an intermediary between buyers and sellers; secondly, to 96 
provide a stabilising influence that guarantees ‘fair dealing’ through the establishment of 97 
transparent pricing.   Research has shown the value of these two related activities to be 98 
potentially significant (Garbade and Silber, 1979; Grossman and Miller, 1988; Venkataraman 99 
and Waisburd, 2007). Indeed, it has been shown that beyond the activity of providing 100 
liquidity and determining pricing the role of the market maker has additional behavioural 101 
effects on market ‘quality’.  That is, the presence of a market maker itself may support the 102 
confidence necessary to facilitate trade and even potentially erode perceived barriers to 103 
entry (Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007).  104 
As the term has garnered greater currency and been applied to a wider range of market 105 
conditions the practical roles and functions that market makers might fulfil have grown.  To 106 
some extent differences in practice are a reflection of context and depend to a large extent 107 
upon the specific nature of the markets in question, customs and regulatory environment, 108 
prompting some to begin new work on the behavioural typologies of market makers and the 109 
corresponding character of the markets they make (for example, Zhu et al., 2009).  As a 110 
result the strength of market makers’ position and their stabilising influence may vary giving 111 
rise to different market characteristics in each case.  More research on the behavioural 112 
economics of market making activities is needed to explore these questions more fully 113 
across the board.  Nevertheless this association between the character of the system under 114 
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which markets are made and the outcomes that follow is worth emphasising as it potentially 115 
has explanatory value for other areas where markets might require some form of ‘making’. 116 
The central contention of this paper is that there may be good grounds for thinking of land 117 
and property as one such market. To return to the earlier definition of the basic functions a 118 
market maker provides (and under what circumstances) - the control of liquidity and the 119 
guarantor of fair dealing – there are clear parallels between market makers in other spheres 120 
and the role planning playsin many contexts, as custodian of liquidity (in the form of the 121 
land supply) and as a regulatory body that evenly applies the rule book of planning law.  122 
Moreover, as real estate is a product created at the confluence of state-civil-market 123 
relations the systemic obstacles this presents to a straightforward matching of buyers and 124 
sellers further points to the necessity for a market making intermediary.  As the agency that 125 
controls market liquidity, effectively animates the development process and, as a result, has 126 
a material effect on market stability and pricing there are good grounds to think of planning 127 
as a form of market maker for land and real estate: a quite different interpretation of the 128 
activity to that which pervades the understanding of planning as a solely regulatory brake 129 
on development amongst, for example, UK policy makers.   130 
Moreover, similar to the contextual differences that might give character to, for example, 131 
various countries’ securities exchanges so too the terms under which planning is charged 132 
with catalysing development might provide qualitative clues to variations in how nations 133 
administer development and, ultimately, the character of the built environments that 134 
follow. 135 
The research: methods and concepts 136 
7 
 
Exploring this conjecture means confronting questions that are perennial in planning.  For 137 
example, adherents to the New Institutional Economics have long sought to explore what 138 
planning might be said to achieve through a transaction cost framework (for example, Lai 139 
and Lorne, 2015).  For others the set of activities collected together under the banner 140 
‘market making’ might be said to have been fulsomely described in the empirical literature 141 
on the correction of market failures, for example, through the US programme of Urban 142 
Renewal (Rapkin, 1980).   143 
   144 
Building on this literature developments in game theory, and the emergence of the related 145 
behavioural economics, have presented clear challenges to the fundamental psychological 146 
assumptions of rational, self-interested decision making that underpin the neoclassical 147 
paradigm (Samsom, 2015).  As such this developing field seeks to understand the reasoning, 148 
heuristics, emotion and, sometimes, irrationality that explains the range of decisions we 149 
make in a wide array of economic settings.  Academic work in this area has been 150 
successfully translated into popular accounts that have gone on to become bestsellers 151 
(Levitt and Dubner, 2007, 2010; Harford, 2007, 2014).  Often the underlying economic 152 
questions asked, particularly in an empirical sense, speak directly to and build upon 153 
principles from game theory such as attitudes to risk, loss aversion and first mover 154 
problems/advantages. 155 
From this point of view there are points of tangency between this branch of economics and 156 
aspects of the New Institutional Economics (bounded rationality, a focus on formal and 157 
informal codes of practice as ‘rules of the game’).  However, the microeconomics of 158 
psychology that permeate game theory and behavioural economics provide a clearly 159 
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defined focus on human practices irrespective of their origins, or otherwise, within an 160 
institutional framework.  That is, NIE and game theory share an interest in the role played by 161 
institutions in animating markets (e.g. Bromley, 2014; Bromley and Hiedanpää, 2016) but for 162 
game theorists (and behavioural economists) much greater focus is placed on the micro-163 
agential role played by individual actors in shaping and determining the character of the 164 
institutions, both formal and informal, that people them.  Approaching planning in this way 165 
entails thinking of it less as a noun and more as a verb: not an institution or framework but a 166 
peopled activity that involves multiple participants that may each deploy separate strategies 167 
in relation to one another.  It is also not an activity that pertains only to those areas where 168 
there is some evidence of market failure.  The interactions that underpin market 169 
transactions in real estate markets are equally relevant in prosperous locations 170 
characterised by high demand.  Every instance of market transaction, irrespective of 171 
context, is a new round of the planning game (Lord, 2012).    172 
The implied research agenda is enormous and with respect to planning is in its nascent stage 173 
(Adams and Tiesdell, 2010; Ferrari et al., 2011; Samsura et al., 2015).  In this contribution we 174 
aim to focus on just one aspect of what this agenda might entail – varying approaches to the 175 
market making activity of managing liquidity in land supply.  To do this we take a cue from 176 
others (for example, Annand and Lea, 2011; Gordon 2011; Piore, 2006) in applying concepts 177 
from game theory to inform a qualitative empirical investigation of systemic behavioural 178 
differences in how the activity of planning is animated in different contexts.   179 
In choosing case studies we were interested to explore a range of governmental settings 180 
where planning is explicitly charged with playing an economically-active role.  As the 181 
research was funded under the Royal Town Planning Institute’s SPIREe (Small Project Impact 182 
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Research) programme this objective was balanced against a desire to explore these 183 
questions within the context of Britain’s nearest neighbours.  The desirability of this near 184 
European focus was reinforced by academic calls, such as Adams and Watkins’ (2014) 185 
invocation, for research to parse European experiences of new forms of planning practice 186 
that seek to actively animate development.   187 
Following a thorough literature review of planning reform in continental Europe (for 188 
instance, Colomb, 2007; Hong and Needham, 2007; NAO, 2007; PRP, URBED and Design for 189 
Homes, 2008; Oxley et al, 2009; Helbrecht and Dirksmeier, 2012; Hall, 2014; Falk, 2014) 190 
three cases were selected as representing city-based case studies of how planning might 191 
play an economically active role in managing liquidity to catalyse development: the coalition 192 
of actors that have cooperated on multiple urban projects in Lille and its neighbouring 193 
towns and cities in the Nord-pas-de-Calais-Picardie region of France; the use of a form of 194 
public land development that prioritises strategic bargaining with private actors in 195 
Hamburg’s HafenCity development; and the introduction of urban land readjustment 196 
policies in the Netherlands following the historic use of the Dutch public land development 197 
model. 198 
The project ran from March-November 2015.  As we were seeking to gain a qualitative 199 
impression of differences in real world approaches to controlling land supply the data 200 
produced to inform the research was generated by semi-structured interviews carried out 201 
with key individuals in each case study area.  In addition relevant documents for each case 202 
study were reviewed.   203 
The objective in data collection was to explore the range of market making activities that 204 
are entailed by planning’s control of liquidity as a conduit to catalysing development.  205 
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Because the markets through which new real estate is produced have specific peculiarities 206 
the act of controlling liquidity in the development process is overlaid with questions of 207 
sequencing, consensus building and coalition formation.  As a result, in conceptual terms 208 
the range of activities that this implies are best treated through the language of game 209 
theory which explicitly take the dynamics of counterparty interactions as its principal focus 210 
(see, Samsura, van der Krabben and van Deeman, 2010; Lord, 2012).  To facilitate exchange 211 
between this body of economic thought and the specific question of how planning as an 212 
economic agent acts to manage liquidity in the development process we can point to three 213 
key concepts from game theory that have clear explanatory resonance with respect to the 214 
act of making real estate markets: ‘first mover’ problems; coalition games and attitude to 215 
risk.   216 
Developing the game theoretic understanding of planning practice 217 
i. First mover problems 218 
Because urban development is so fundamentally dependent upon the sequential 219 
coordination of multiple stakeholders, controlling liquidity in the land supply comprises 220 
aspects of a collective action problem that have a peculiarly temporal aspect (Cadman and 221 
Austin Crowe, 1978; Goodchild and Munton, 1985; Gurran and Phibbs, 2013; Meen et al., 222 
2016).  Even in circumstances where every stakeholder could reasonably expect to stand to 223 
gain from (re)development, delay is often caused by the question of which party should 224 
bear the risk of acting first.  This issue is particularly acute where the actions of the first 225 
mover will confer material benefits on second (and subsequent) movers: such as where 226 
remediation work by one landowner benefits a neighbour.   The corresponding systemic 227 
delay that is the hallmark of some planning systems is, therefore, perhaps best understood 228 
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as a collective action stand-off with a sequential dynamic.  This ‘failure to launch’, in which 229 
the cooperation of multiple actors is necessary in order to achieve a particular end, is a long-230 
acknowledged phenomenon (Olson, 1965).  However, how this question might be recast as 231 
a first-mover problem complete with a deeper appreciation of the behavioural 232 
characteristics of the development process has not so far been clearly adumbrated.   233 
At base the problem is one of mutual trust versus the fear of free riding.  For the strategic 234 
alignment of interests and the development of mutual trust to emerge the latent 235 
uncertainty that each party holds as to each others’ position must be reduced to a point 236 
where one participant is sufficiently emboldened to ‘nudge’ the market into life.  For some 237 
post-positivist planning theorists this might be best achieved through disclosure and open 238 
dialogue - although others have questioned the degree to which private developers would 239 
be willing to share commercially sensitive information, or how we would ever know if the 240 
revealed position was genuine or strategic (Bengs, 2005; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 241 
1998).   242 
So, how might the first mover obstacle to land release be overcome?  One possible 243 
approach is to acknowledge that land and real estate markets are peculiar and demand 244 
overt public-private cooperation (Mazzucato, 2013); namely, a state agency that in its 245 
regulatory capacity also performs open market operations to instigate a chain of action in 246 
the other actors in the development process.  This may take many forms.  For example, the 247 
first move may be the creation of a state or quasi-state institution that acts as a coordinator 248 
of the development process, thus providing confidence to investors and raising levels of 249 
trust between market actors – the equivalent of the ‘market quality’ said to arise in other 250 
areas as a function of the presence of a market maker.  Alternatively, the state may institute 251 
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a regulatory framework (or a moderated local version such as through an enterprise zone) 252 
that uses incentives and penalties to engineer a desired response from the development 253 
industry.  Finally, it may be that where the problem of coordination seems intractable a 254 
third party – possibly the state acting directly as investor – may demonstrate its 255 
commitment to redevelopment by itself acting as first mover to facilitate wider market 256 
participation subsequently.   257 
Empirical examples of all three forms of open market activities by planners through planning 258 
systems designed with this end in mind can be found in each of the cases.  The example 259 
provided by the polycentric city region surrounding Lille, led by its city regional governance 260 
body, the Métropole Europénne de Lille (MEL), serves well to illustrate the first of the three 261 
alternative first moves outlined above.  Whilst the MEL has taken a multifaceted approach 262 
to the city-region’s regeneration (Colomb, 2007; Hall, 2014) over a sustained period of time 263 
the vast majority of its activities have necessitated coordination across a fragmented 264 
geography comprising 85 communes.  Perhaps the best specific example of this has been 265 
the development of the Euralille office and retail development that connects Lille’s principal 266 
rail station with the city centre. 267 
The rationale behind the Euralille development was that the construction of a high-speed 268 
rail station through which trains would pass en route from London and Paris to Brussels 269 
would provide Lille with an opportunity to attract new investment and employers to the 270 
city.  However, at its outset the project was slow to commence.  A reluctance on the part of 271 
the private development industry, which had largely abandoned Lille in favour of more 272 
readily profitable locations elsewhere in France, to invest in Euralille stalled the 273 
commencement of the redevelopment project.   274 
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In response a Societé d’Economie Mixte (SEM) was established, a temporary public sector-275 
led, majority public sector-owned, public-private limited company which was used to raise 276 
debt finance at lower interest rates than would be available to private investors.  This in 277 
turn facilitated a first move on behalf of the SEM in the shape of land assembly and 278 
remediation.  Colomb (2007: 37) describes this strategy as one that ‘mobilised energy from 279 
various stakeholders (public, private) and changed the external image of the city’.  Stated 280 
alternatively it was a first move that was essential to ‘unlock’ the Euralille site for 281 
development.  Private investment followed in an approach that has been replicated in other 282 
French cities using similar models, such as the Établissement Public Foncier (Dupont, 2011). 283 
A more aggressive form of planning acting as first mover can be observed in relation to the 284 
public land development model used in the Netherlands since the 1940s under which 285 
municipalities acquired land at pre-planning permission cost before fully servicing it with 286 
roads and other public infrastructure, dividing it into parcels and selling these on to private 287 
developers with specified development rights. This ‘public top-down comprehensive model’ 288 
of development (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013) facilitated the uplift in price that results 289 
from the award of planning permission to be taken as profit by the municipalities as 290 
compensation for acting as first mover.  An additional and enduring advantage of the public 291 
land development model was that, by making the first move in the development process, 292 
the municipality was in a strong position to shape the nature of development that followed. 293 
Evidence from our research would suggest that this usually took the un-priced form of 294 
directing the behaviour of private developers towards the achievement of public policy 295 
goals, such as the linking of new development to existing infrastructure and services and, up 296 
until a 2008 change in law, the provision of social housing.  One interviewee pointed to the 297 
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leverage that acting as first mover accorded to the state in shaping the behaviour of the 298 
development industry that moved next: 299 
‘One reason, under the old planning law, that the public sector wanted to 300 
interfere in the land market, was that they wanted to guarantee sufficient land 301 
for social housing, and by owning the land they could choose who to sell it to so 302 
they could guarantee social housing,’ (Dutch urban planning university 303 
department interview, 2015) 304 
The ability to encourage social outcomes as a result of bearing the risk of being the first 305 
mover is echoed by other evidence that supports the view that public land development 306 
model allowed municipalities to play an active role in rebalancing real estate markets 307 
through cross-subsidising development in locations less favourable to private investment.  308 
By using proceeds realised in locations more desirable to the development industry 309 
interviewees pointed to the potential for municipalities to use these proceeds to again act 310 
as first mover in neighbourhoods less immediately attractive to developers (Dutch urban 311 
planning university department interview, 2015; Dutch Land Registry interview, 2015).  312 
These features have prompted interest in the potential of this approach where the state 313 
takes on first mover responsibilities to animate the development process in the UK 314 
(Cheshire et al, 2014). 315 
The public land development approach to controlling liquidity was clearly characterised by a 316 
highly interventionist approach for the state.  Large scale development could be hastened 317 
by the fact that planning was backed by the state to bear all the risk of being first mover.  318 
Correspondingly this had the advantage of meaning that liquidity could be controlled and 319 
the subsequent behaviour of the development industry could be very significantly shaped.  320 
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However, the disadvantages of this approach are that releasing large amounts of land very 321 
rapidly may have compounded the price shock to the Dutch real estate market following the 322 
financial crisis of 2008 onwards.  The best example of this is the national programme of 323 
housing growth, the VINEX (Vierdpublic e Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra), a huge 324 
programme of land release operating under the terms of the public land development 325 
model.  Interviewees suggested that the negative price effects experienced by this 326 
programme were a result of the macro shock to the Dutch economy in 2008 exacerbated by 327 
a very rapid release of liquidity.  328 
A highly active and risk taking state may also have prompted an unexpected/unwanted 329 
behavioural change in the Dutch development industry.  Some interviewees pointed out 330 
that the longevity of the Public Land Development model had resulted in Dutch developers 331 
becoming accustomed to a low-risk business model where they could rely on planning to act 332 
as first mover and bear, what some might think should be, the risks that are the counterpart 333 
to the rewards associated with entrepreneurship. 334 
Appetite for the public land development model diminished in the period following the 2008 335 
global financial crisis as many Dutch municipalities were left in financial difficulties due in 336 
large measure to outstanding debts with the Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten, the national 337 
bank specialising in lending to public sector organisations to finance public land 338 
development. In the immediate aftermath of these events whilst the public land 339 
development model remains available for use in the Netherlands its association with public 340 
sector indebtedness has led to a search for new ways of disentangling the knotted problem 341 
of controlling land release through overcoming first mover problems in the development 342 
process.   343 
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In the Netherlands the principal response to this question has been an exploration of urban 344 
land readjustment – an approach that has been previously employed in a number of 345 
international contexts, including Germany, Spain, Australia and Japan, and has been 346 
endorsed by the World Bank since the 1970s (Doebele, 2007), while the analogous ‘urban 347 
partnership zone’ has been proposed for use in the UK context (Adams et al, 2001).   348 
The essential objective of urban land readjustment is to manage liquidity where a coherent 349 
site is held in multiple ownership.  Often such sites are sub-divided in such a way as to make 350 
wholesale redevelopment implausible.  Under urban land readjustment a temporary pooling 351 
of land holdings is followed by reconfiguration and servicing of the site into a layout more 352 
conducive to development/redevelopment through the planning system before the now 353 
more valuable plots are released to market.  It is, therefore, an approach well-suited for use 354 
in cases where “the boundaries of the rights to land ownership or land use may impede the 355 
desired use of the area as a whole” (Needham, 2007: 115).  At root, urban land 356 
readjustment is fundamentally concerned with governing liquidity by overcoming the first 357 
mover problem through the alignment of multiple strategic interests towards a common 358 
goal, avoiding the necessity of there being a single investor willing to bear all the risk of 359 
negotiating the acquisition of multiple plots of land on a case-by-case basis, or of the often 360 
disruptive, drawn-out and complex process of compulsory purchase in the case of public 361 
sector development agencies. 362 
So conceived urban land readjustment offers a solution to the governance of liquidity by 363 
pooling the risks and rewards of development across landowners, developers and planning.   364 
As such it speaks to either or both of the two forms of first move described at the beginning 365 
of this section - the establishment of a common institution to raise levels of mutual trust 366 
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and the use of a regulatory framework to incentivise cooperative action.  In the case of the 367 
former, urban land readjustment may proceed by the pooling of land and property rights 368 
into a jointly or publically owned development agency that re-parcels and redevelops the 369 
site according to the prior agreement of property owners.  In the case of the latter, urban 370 
land readjustment may proceed from the simple legal guarantee of land and property rights 371 
throughout the course of the redevelopment, ensuring that the readjustment process can 372 
continue to completion.  In both models planning plays an important market marking role, 373 
‘collecting all the signals from the different owners and [saying] there’s scope for 374 
redevelopment by urban land readjustment there’ (Dutch Land Registry interview, 2015).  In 375 
various circumstances either approach may be an essential precursor to the effective 376 
release of new sites for development; although it is the latter approach that has been 377 
selected as the basis of an on-going pilot project in the Netherlands, where there is a 378 
preference, post-VINEX, for planning to be more behaviourally risk-averse. 379 
ii. Coalition formation 380 
As noted above planning’s market making role as frequently entails the establishment of 381 
multi-agent cooperation.  These coalitions of interest often first emerge as a solution to the 382 
first mover problem.  However, because the development process can be protracted the 383 
stability of these coalitions of actors over a sustained period of time is necessary to 384 
guarantee that initial land release is ultimately translated into new development.  Where 385 
agents are engaged in a constant shifting of allegiances, collective solutions are highly 386 
improbable.  All these observations point to the pivotal role planning can play in providing a 387 
strong framework for the establishment and stability of coalitions necessary to guarantee 388 
land release and subsequent development.   389 
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One such way in which planning can seek to engineer coalition formation and stability is 390 
through behavioural prompts.  All other things being equal, cooperative game theory would 391 
suggest that coalition stability is a function of the relative payoff to coalition members:  the 392 
accrual to each member must be sufficient to ensure their commitment to the wider cause 393 
(Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkarr, 2015; see essays in Roth, 1988).  For the market maker 394 
there is, therefore, a need to consider the use of incentives and penalties (or threats of 395 
penalties) to encourage collaborative/cooperative behaviour across the coalition as a whole.  396 
The range of questions that are logically entailed by these predictions of theory include who 397 
is likely to partner with whom; how stable are the coalitions that might emerge; how might 398 
‘fair shares’ be agreed upon between coalition members; and what effect will coalition 399 
dynamics have on the specific character of the development that follows? 400 
Our research in Continental Europe points to a wide variety of experiences with respect to 401 
these questions of coalition formation and stability.  Coalitions of different forms operating 402 
over different timescales and devised to meet different ends within the development 403 
process were found in each of the case studies.   404 
In Hamburg the establishment of a state owned development company, ‘HafenCity 405 
Hamburg GmbH’ (at the time known as Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortendwicklung, 406 
GHS), to oversee the redevelopment of the city’s old docklands has proved essential to 407 
coordinating the activities of a coalition of interests.  The breadth of this coalition has been 408 
systematically inscribed into the redevelopment of the area as a whole due to the way in 409 
which the development corporation has controlled liquidity through an allocation 410 
mechanism that fosters coalition formation and stability.  Under a policy of ‘spatial 411 
segmentation’ the HafenCity area was sub-divided into a large number of relatively small 412 
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plots with the corresponding stipulation that any developer was entitled to purchase just 413 
one plot.  This has given rise to a tightly controlled ‘drip release’ of developable sites and a 414 
very large coalition of developers, each relatively powerless as an individual relative to the 415 
wider set.  The internal dynamic of the coalition is also important.  By associating control of 416 
liquidity with a group dynamic there are important behavioural cues given to the engaged 417 
developers who are simultaneously collaborating with the development corporation on the 418 
wider vision for the area as a whole and, through a process of competitive tendering in 419 
which design criteria are strongly weighted, competing with each other for the right to 420 
develop a single site (see for fuller details, Lord et al., 2015).  This approach to 421 
redevelopment echoes aspects of other market making activities where assets are bundled 422 
and/or repackaged (Mantovani, 2013) and contrasts sharply with the approach to 423 
controlling liquidity in real estate markets prevalent in other contexts, such as the UK, 424 
where large sites are typically released whole and usually developed solely by one, 425 
consequently quite powerful, volume developer.  426 
A coalition of a different type can be found in the Métropole Europénne de Lille (MEL), a 427 
good example of what Lefèvre (2008) terms the inter-municipal joint authorities model, in 428 
which an indirectly elected board administers a cooperative grouping of local authorities 429 
that have collectively transferred some important responsibilities over policy and spending 430 
to a city-regional scale umbrella authority.  This joint body has existed since 1967 before 431 
undergoing additions and name changes over the following decades until the incorporation 432 
of the coalition as a Communautés Urbaine in 1996 and since January 1st 2015 as the 433 
Métropole Europénne de Lille (MEL). 434 
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By the turn of the 2000s the Communauté Urbaine had engineered a consensus across the 435 
larger communes that comprise the Lille city-region founded on two principles.  Firstly, the 436 
economic success of the city region as a whole was established as depending on policy 437 
markers’ ability to establish Lille as an attractive location for internationally footloose 438 
service and knowledge-based industries>  Secondly, for such a strategy to work, the social 439 
and economic prospects of the less affluent communes, most notably Roubaix and 440 
Tourcoing, had to be addressed (Hall, 2014).  However, crucially, in order to access funds 441 
controlled by the city regional authority, projects had to be collectively agreed by the 442 
leaders of the four largest communes, Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing and Villeneuve d’Ascq. 443 
The sort of cooperation engineered in the MEL can best be understood as a long-term 444 
governance coalition, the stability of which has been dependent upon the relative payoffs to 445 
each member being sufficient to maintain their commitment to the wider group.  446 
Cooperative game theory offers an avenue to understanding the integrity of a ‘grand 447 
coalition’ such as that described across Greater Lille, using the concept of ‘superadditivity’: 448 
the notion that the stability of the coalition is dependent upon each coalition member 449 
perceiving that their interests are better served inside the coalition than by acting alone.  450 
In game theory this concept is codified through the identification of what constitutes ‘fair 451 
shares’ within such a coalition.  The ‘Shapley value’, (Shapley, 1953; see also Roth, 1988), 452 
offers the most widely accepted way of calculating what division of resources is sufficient to 453 
maintain coalition stability.  The Shapley value is defined as the marginal contribution of 454 
each agent to the value obtained by the grand coalition of agents.  With regard to its 455 
practical applicability, the Shapley value has been used to model voting patterns in 456 
committees, where voter coalitions are formed (Straffin, 1977), a useful point of congruence 457 
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with planning of the form practiced in Greater Lille, in which decision-making is systemically 458 
designed to be cooperative. 459 
The outcomes of such an approach to organising urban (re)development on the basis of 460 
mutually agreed investment was spelt out by one interviewee:   461 
 ‘There are still some fields in which solidarity can play a part, typically for 462 
renovation for derelict housing and things like that. There’s a need for some kind 463 
of public support … the idea that there should be some solidarity between the 464 
slightly richer city of Lille and Roubaix and Tourcoing has always been accepted’ 465 
(Lille urban planning department interview, 2015). 466 
This echoes some of the findings set out in the previous section regarding the use of the 467 
public land development model in the Netherlands to encourage a spatial 468 
rebalancing/redistribution of development activity towards less affluent areas.  Further 469 
research could potentially explore the degree to which coalition stability in urban 470 
development is, as the Shapley Value would suggest, dependent upon a perceived 471 
association between a member’s contribution and reward or whether other behavioural 472 
characteristics – such as altruism or threats and penalties – explain coalition stability. 473 
iii. Distribution of risk 474 
The previous two sections have illustrated the inextricable connections between the initial 475 
release of land and the subsequent orchestration of development through multi-agent 476 
coalitions.  The behavioural character of the coalitions that follow are, however, likely to be 477 
shaped by the distribution of risk and rewards.  As Ratcliffe et al (2009: 421) note, “risk is 478 
the very business of property development, and uncertainty the prevailing climate within 479 
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which development takes place”.  Risk is, therefore, a key determinant of the behavioural 480 
traits that serve to define the development process in any given setting. 481 
In game theory individual attitudes to risk are codified through the derivation of a utility 482 
function that delineates a spectrum from the extremes of risk aversion to risk loving.  483 
However, it is important to note that the attitude of the individual to risk is hugely 484 
dependent upon the specific nature of the economic decision they are confronted with, 485 
particularly the asset under consideration and the period over which the individual has to 486 
think about how strongly they value that asset.  An overall measure of the degree of risk 487 
aversion one takes into general economic decision making is very likely to be quite different 488 
to a specific case where one must contemplate, say, the question of a decision that carries a 489 
legal precedent that might have decades-long implications.    490 
This issue of risk aversion is so significant in relation to planning and real estate markets 491 
because investments in the built environment are characterised by behavioural traits that 492 
are peculiar to this specific sector of the economy.  For example, planning decisions that 493 
involve a significant stimulus to land supply fundamentally entail landscape altering effects 494 
that bear a decades-long (or longer) shadow.  As a result the nature of the decision making 495 
environment may make risk aversion and protracted consideration of development 496 
proposals much more likely.  In the language of behavioural economics this speaks to the 497 
propensity for ‘status-quo bias’ (for example, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) – and 498 
therefore a potential reluctance on the part of planning to release land for development.  499 
More widely in neighbourhoods characterised by capital flight and property market 500 
deterioration it may be the case that re-establishing a market requires the state to actively 501 
counter risk aversion in the private development industry.  502 
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In behavioural terms this points to an analytical paradox: planning’s market making role is 503 
one that entails/necessitates an appetite for risk, but the character of the underlying asset it 504 
controls in the development process, land and the natural environment, might be expected 505 
to encourage risk-averse decision making. From this perspective the distribution of risk 506 
across a development coalition is perhaps the fundamental determinant of the behavioural 507 
character of the ensuing development process. 508 
Our research points to very different behavioural outcomes as a function of the distribution 509 
of risk.  In a city region adversely affected by deindustrialisation, urban development 510 
projects on the scale of Euralille and others initiated in metropolitan Lille since the early 511 
1990s could not have occurred had it not been for the kind of mutually-agreed, sustained 512 
public investment programme set in train by the coalition of interests outlined in the 513 
previous section.  A major role played by the MEL has been to assume a significant 514 
proportion of the risk associated with urban redevelopment across the conurbation.  515 
Euralille demonstrates the benefits that can accrue from such risk-taking, as the 516 
development has been successful in the long-term both in its own terms and in helping to 517 
kick-start further regeneration in the wider city region.  Conversely the collapse of real 518 
estate values in the Netherlands following the 2008 global financial crisis has revealed the 519 
dangers with models, such as the Dutch public land development approach, that 520 
systemically places much of the upfront risk on publically funded planning  It is this 521 
experience that has prompted a reappraisal of Dutch municipalities’ desire to share too 522 
great a proportion of the burden of upfront risk and has resulted in the exploration of 523 
different models, such as urban land readjustment, that share risk more evenly among all 524 
counterparties according to their initial landholdings, investment and potential payoff.   525 
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The previous public land development model was premised on markets being made by a 526 
stimulus to supply in the shape of a first move by an emboldened and risk-taking form of 527 
planning.  This behaviour then prompted the establishment of development coalitions, the 528 
stability of which was aided by the fact that they were able to effectively under-share in the 529 
risks of development (as these were disproportionately assumed by planning) and 530 
potentially over-share in the rewards at the conclusion of the process.  To use the language 531 
of game theory the marginal return to developers’ membership of the coalition exceeded 532 
their marginal contribution and so the concept of the Shapley Value would suggest coalition 533 
stability and, correspondingly, market liquidity followed by relatively rapid development.  534 
Undertaking this approach at a very large scale (such as through the VINEX programme) 535 
resulted in rapid land release that may have exacerbated the worst effects of the financial 536 
crisis on Dutch housing markets post-2008.  The subsequent search for methods that share 537 
risk more evenly between public and private sectors, such as urban land development, have 538 
been spawned by a desire for a less definitive first move by planning and a generally more 539 
chastened approach to making the market for urban development. By extension, for this 540 
approach to work will require a behavioural shift from a Dutch development industry that 541 
had become accustomed to the favourable terms of the public land development approach. 542 
This remarkable shift in the behaviours that explain changes in how the Dutch development 543 
process is animated begins with the question of how market liquidity is handled but 544 
necessitates a more fulsome account of dependent issues pertaining to the relationship 545 
between other participants in the process.   546 
These empirical observations on how such markets are made in the Netherlands contrasts 547 
sharply with the experiences of other contexts.  For example, whilst HafenCity GmbH has 548 
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also borne the majority of the first mover development risk by acting as the coordinating 549 
agency and installing the requisite infrastructure for the area in its entirety it has also strictly 550 
controlled liquidity very strictly.  By sub-dividing the area into a relatively large number of 551 
smaller plots and allocating these plots competitively within a broader development 552 
coalition the redevelopment area as a whole has generally proven quite resilient to the risk 553 
of external shocks: commercial vacancy rates are low and rates of construction completions 554 
are high (HafenCity development agency interview, 2015).   555 
By contrast where the question of liquidity (and attendant issues) is less carefully 556 
considered deadlock can prevail.  Game theory would suggest that behavioural stasis is 557 
most likely to characterise those situations where no party is sufficiently empowered to 558 
make a first move.  In the development process this outcome might be most expected in 559 
circumstances where planning is confined to a wholly regulatory function and/or where a 560 
single agency, such as a volume house builder, as is often the case in the UK, must bear all 561 
the risk associated with assembling and building out a large site.  Exploring the potential for 562 
planning to act as a market maker that manages liquidity through a distributed model of risk 563 
sharing might help avoid the lengthy lead times, delays and disruptions that seem to 564 
routinely afflict even flagship developments in the UK – for example, the standoff between 565 
developer and local/national state such as was reported at the new Garden City in 566 
Ebbslfleet (Linney, 2015). 567 
 568 
Conclusion 569 
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We began this paper by acknowledging that urban and environmental planning can create 570 
market distortions.  In conceding this point we merely accept that making real estate 571 
markets is complex and turns on managing liquidity within the context of sustained multi-572 
agency cooperation and competition.  More widely, our aim in this paper was to show that 573 
planning can play a (varied) range of fundamentally important roles in this regard; roles that 574 
are barely acknowledged in the political campaign against it.  The experiences of other 575 
countries – the UK’s nearest Continental neighbours – where planning is effectively charged 576 
with controlling liquidity through market making practices.   577 
Conceiving of planning as occupying this wider position of animating development means 578 
taking a similarly broader framework than the limiting uni-equilibria approach offered by 579 
neoclassical economics to understand its impacts.  Market making is an activity that may be 580 
best thought of as context and transaction specific.  The range of experiences from near 581 
Continental Europe outlined in this paper show that planning can catalyse development in 582 
multiple ways using a variety of instruments and with remarkably different ends.  The 583 
behaviour of participants in each setting will be an outcome of the terms set by the legal 584 
system within which transactions take place and the individual strategies deployed by 585 
market participants themselves.  In this sense the behavioural aspects of planning and the 586 
real estate markets bear important similarities to other market contexts.  As Madhavan and 587 
Sofianos (1998) point out about such markets for financial instruments, “although specialists 588 
play an important role in price formation, we still know relatively little about their behaviour 589 
and its consequences”.  It is argued here that we know less still about the range of 590 
behaviours that underpin the markets that make cities, particularly when we own that 591 
markets for urban (re)development are highly contextually variegated.  The actions of 592 
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planners seeking to stimulate development in a setting characterised by population loss and 593 
market decline will inevitably be quite different to those seeking to accommodate 594 
development in a sensitive and sustainable fashion in a growth area.  Yet both demand a 595 
role for the state, usually through planning, to make these markets work.   596 
From this perspective calls for deregulation from the development industry, the political 597 
right and neoclassical analysts are one, but not the only, option for systemic reform.  The 598 
lessons from this paper allow us to conceive of various alternatives including variations on a 599 
more economically active planning profession that may adopt a variety of different 600 
approaches to manage liquidity, unlock development and shape it constructively.  For 601 
academics the post-hoc analysis of this form of planning will mean mirroring developments 602 
in mainstream economics, specifically a move away from neoclassical analysis and a much 603 
fuller engagement with the psychology of economic decision making vis a vis planning.  604 
There is evidence that this work is beginning in cognate attempts to understand the 605 
psychology and emotions that shape planning decisions (for example, Baum, 2015).  606 
Framing planning questions in this way also opens up the possibility that academics might 607 
have a role in shaping the future of planning systems through further research aimed at 608 
developing a more fine-grained understanding of the behavioural economics of planning 609 
practice.   610 
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